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FREELANCE ISN’T FREE: THE HIGH COST OF
NEW YORK CITY’S FREELANCE ISN’T FREE
ACT ON HIRING PARTIES
ABSTRACT
Recently, the New York City Council enacted the Freelance Isn’t Free
Act (FIFA) to protect freelancers from non-payment. Among FIFA’s
protections is the requirement that hiring parties provide a written contract
to freelancers for any work exceeding $800 over a 120-day period. As the
nation’s first legislation ensuring freelancers’ rights, FIFA marks a major
turning point in the development of protections for the gig economy’s
growing independent workforce. While its purpose is laudable and
necessary, this Note argues that FIFA is currently too ambiguous. To resolve
FIFA’s ambiguity, this Note recommends, at the very least, amending FIFA
to include: 1) a specific jurisdictional provision; 2) a clarification of the
definition of a freelance worker; and 3) a good faith defense provision for
hiring parties. Additionally, this Note suggests that all hiring parties—
whether located in New York City or conducting business with freelancers
located in New York City—take the following actions: 1) confirm whether
their workers are acting as freelancers under FIFA’s protections or
employees; 2) enter into written contracts with any existing and future
freelancers; 3) pay freelancers as agreed; and 4) be proactive if a complaint
is received from a freelancer under FIFA.
INTRODUCTION
With the rise of the digitally-enabled gig economy, 1 employers today are
relying less on traditional nine-to-five employees and more on freelance
workers. 2 In fact, alternative work arrangements comprise nearly all of the
net employment growth in the American economy since 2005. 3 Today,

1. The phrase “gig economy” refers to the recent emergence of business models based on nontraditional work relationships where workers accept short-term assignments from those who
demand their services. See The Sharing Economy: Creating Opportunities for Innovation and
Flexibility: Hearing Before the H. Educ. & the Workforce Comm., 115th Cong. 1, 2–3 (2017)
(statement of Sharon I. Block, Executive Director, Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law
School), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/ED/ED00/20170906/106358/HHRG-115ED00-Wstate-BlockS-20170906.pdf. This “gig economy” concept is also referred to as the “ondemand economy,” “sharing economy,” or “online platform economy.” Id. at 2.
2. See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work
Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015 7–8, 17–18 (Mar. 29, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/lkatz/files/katz_krueger_cws_v3.pdf?m=1
459369766.
3. See The Future of Work: Diving into the Data, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BLOG (June 17, 2017),
https://blog.dol.gov/2016/06/17/the-future-of-work-diving-into-the-data (citing Katz & Kreuger,
supra note 2, at 8).
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approximately 55 million Americans earn a living through freelance work. 4
The 1.3 million freelance workers in New York City (N.Y.C.) are the driving
force behind many businesses, notably the media, fashion, tourism,
construction, and service industries. 5 These freelance workers 6 include many
writers, musicians, accountants, translators, home contractors, day laborers,
nannies, and more. 7
Due to the fast-paced nature of freelance work, freelancers may not
request a contract for their services because formal written documents could
slow them down, causing them to lose out on work opportunities. 8
Consequently, estimates suggest that only 28% of freelancers operate under
written contracts. 9 The lack of a written contract often leads to trouble for
freelancers when seeking payment from hiring parties. 10

4. See Press Release, Upwork, New Study Finds Freelance Econ. Grew to 55 Million
Americans This Year, 35% of Total U.S. Workforce (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.upwork.com/pre
ss/2016/10/06/freelancing-in-america-2016/.
5. Most sources state that there are 1.3 million freelancers in New York City. See, e.g., Sara
Horowitz & Mike McDerment, Freelancers, Now Key to NYC’s Economy, Merit Protection to
Match, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/201
51222/OPINION/151219868/freelancers-now-key-to-nycs-economy-merit-protection-to-match.
However, a few sources cite to a lower, 500,000 figure. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y.C. Off. of the
Mayor, Freelancers Aren’t Free: Mayor Announces First in Nation Protections for Freelance
Workers (May 15, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/307-17/freelancers-arent-free-mayor-first-nation-protections-freelance-workers (“There are an estimated 500,000 freelance
workers that will benefit from this legislation, based on a 2013 study by DOF of New Yorkers
receiving 1099-MISC tax forms [a common income tax form for individuals operating as contingent
‘freelance’ workers].”). Historically, alternative work arrangements have been difficult to clarify
and estimate because of complexity and the lack of statistical data. For a thorough explanation of
the data gaps regarding freelancer statistics, see Annette Bernhardt, Labor Standards and the
Reorganization of Work: Gaps in Data and Research 1–2 (Inst. for Res. on Lab. & Emp., Working
Paper No. 100-14, Jan. 2014), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2014/Labor-Standards-and-the-Reorgan
ization-of-Work.pdf.
6. “Freelance workers include independent contractors, part-time moonlighters, full-time selfemployed workers and others.” N.Y.C. COMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, N.Y.C. COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION 3–4 (Oct. 26, 2016), http://legist
ar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2530972&GUID=61F8754B-80AF-493E-895ED6D17209776E&Options=ID|Text|&Search=freelance [hereinafter N.Y.C. COMM. ON CONSUMER
AFFAIRS, COMM. REP.].
7. See, e.g., Freelance Isn’t Free Act, Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y.C. OFF. OF THE
MAYOR, CONSUMER AFF. 2 (June 2, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/worke
rs/FAQs-Freelance.pdf [hereinafter FIFA FAQ]; N.Y.C. OFF. OF THE MAYOR, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS, DO YOU HIRE FREELANCE WORKERS? KNOW NYC LAW (June 2017), http://www1.nyc.
gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/businesses/Freelance-Info-for-Hiring-Parties.pdf.
8. See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE STATED MEETING OF
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2016, 1:55 PM (Oct. 27, 2016) (citations omitted) [hereinafter N.Y.C.
COUNCIL MINUTES].
9. Id.
10. See Noam Scheiber, As Freelancers’ Ranks Grow, New York Moves to See They Get What
They’re Due, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/nyregion/freelan
cers-city-council-wage-theft.html [hereinafter Scheiber, As Freelancers’ Ranks Grow].
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Statistics reveal that freelancers frequently struggle to collect payment
from hiring parties. 11 Indeed, 71% of freelancers have had difficulties
collecting payment during their careers.12 The average freelancer is cheated
out of approximately $5,968 each year, leading to financial stress. 13 Overall,
estimates suggest that freelancers in New York State (N.Y.S.) are owed
between $2.3 billion and $3.7 billion in unpaid wages annually. 14 While
traditional employees are entitled to statutory protections regarding wage
theft, complaint investigations, and damages enforcement by government
agencies like the N.Y.S. Department of Labor, 15 freelancers do not enjoy
such protections and are forced to either sue or forego their payments. 16
Despite non-payment, the majority of freelancers do not sue to recover
payments owed to them; only 5% of freelancers pursue breach of contract
claims in court, opting to eat their losses rather than endure the time and
expense of litigation. 17
Despite the risk of nonpayment, individuals are increasingly becoming
freelancers, either by choice or necessity. 18 Hiring parties, from small
businesses to international corporations, can now readily retain freelancers to
perform specialized work at a reduced cost, given that freelancers do not
receive employee benefits or unemployment insurance, 19 and freelancers
impose less risk of third-party liability than employees. 20 Most significantly,
11. See Gillian Stoddard Letherberry & Zanib Ahmad, Freelance Isn’t Free Act: Free Webinar
for Freelance Workers, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFF. 10 (June 15, 2017), https://www1.nyc.g
ov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/WebinarTraining-FreelanceWorkers.pdf.
12. See id.
13. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Consumer Affairs Comm., Bill Protecting NYC Freelancers from
Deadbeat Companies Moves Forward with Majority Support (Feb. 29, 2017), https://nycprogressiv
es.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/2-29-16-freelance-act-final-release.pdf.
14. See Testimony of New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer in Support of Int. 1017-A
Before Members of the Committee on Consumer Affairs of the New York City Council (Feb. 29,
2016), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/testimony-of-new-york-city-comptroller-scott-m-stri
nger-in-support-of-int-1017-a-before-members-of-the-committee-on-consumer-affairs-of-thenew-york-city-council/.
15. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Unions in the Precarious Economy, 28 AM. PROSPECT
97 (2017).
16. See N.Y.C. COMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 6.
17. See Testimony of Haeyoung Yoon, National Employment Law Project, Hearing Before New
York City Council Committee on Consumer Affairs on Intro 1017-2015, In Relation to Establishing
Protections for Freelance Workers 2, 3 (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/NEL
P-Testimony-Protections-for-Freelance-Workers-New-York-City.pdf (citations omitted).
18. See Fed. Res. Governor Lael Brainard, Speech at “Evolution of Work,” The “Gig”
Economy: Implications of the Growth of Contingent Work (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.federalre
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20161117a.htm.
19. See Robert W. Wood, Independent Contractor or Employee? The Multiple Issues Involved
in Independent Contractor Status, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., June 2008, at 28; see also The Sharing
Economy: Creating Opportunities for Innovation and Flexibility: Hearing Before the H. Educ. &
the Workforce Comm., 115th Cong. 1, 11–12 (Sept. 6, 2017) (written statement of Arun
Sundararajan, Professor at NYU Sch. of Bus.), available at https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploade
dfiles/sundararajan_-_testimony.pdf.
20. While hiring parties are not liable for the acts of independent contractors under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, legislation may expressly make hiring parties liable for independent
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unlike employees who are paid on an hourly or salary basis, hiring parties
only pay freelancers for the work performed. 21 While hiring parties must
annually provide Form W-2 Tax and Wage Statements to employees, 22 hiring
parties provide freelancers who worked “on the books” 23 with Form 1099MISC Miscellaneous Income Statements. 24
The use of freelancers has traditionally represented an administrative and
operating cost savings to hiring parties; 25 however, new legislation has
complicated the use of freelancers by hiring parties. 26 Recently, N.Y.C.
sought to remedy some of the problems faced by freelancers with the passage
of the Freelance Isn’t Free Act (FIFA or the Act). 27 Passed in October 2016
and effective May 2017, 28 FIFA seeks to ensure basic protections for
freelancers, aiming to reduce the time freelancers spend collecting payments
and increase the time they spend developing their businesses and promoting
their services. 29 Specifically, FIFA imposes stringent requirements on hiring
parties, 30 who are broadly defined as any person who retains a freelance

contractors in certain scenarios. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(13)(c) (2017) (making an
employer liable for an independent contractor’s discrimination).
21. See Kaitlin Fox, Gig Economy, Independent Contractors, and New York Law, NAT’L L. REV.
(June 8, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/gig-economy-independent-contractors-andnew-york-law.
22. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS W-2 AND W3, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2w3.pdf (last updated May 2, 2017).
23. Paying “off the books” or “under the table” wages is fraud. See Employer Misclassification
of Workers, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.labor.ny.gov/ui/employerinfo/employer-misclass
ification-of-workers.shtm (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
24. A hiring party must provide a Form 1099-MISC to, inter alia, someone who received at least
$600 for services performed and is not an employee. See U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-MISC,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc.pdf (last updated Oct. 12, 2017).
25. See Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-driverspsychological-tricks.html (estimating that classifying drivers as independent contractors lowers
direct costs for ridesharing companies by roughly 25%); see also David Bauer, The
Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 141 (2015) (“According to a study done in 2000 of nine states commissioned
by the Department of Labor’s Employment Administration, ‘[t]he number one reason employers
use [independent contractors] and/or misclassify employees is the savings in not paying workers’
compensation premiums and not being subject to workplace injury and disability-related
disputes.’”).
26. See Richard J. Reibstein et al., Defects in NYC’s Freelance Bill, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 2016, at
6 [hereinafter Reibstein et al., Defects].
27. FIFA (Local Law 140 of 2016) consists of laws located in Chapter 10, Title 20 of the N.Y.C.
Admin. Code. FIFA was later augmented by rules located in Chapter 12, Title 6 of the Rules of the
City of New York, which went into effect on July 24, 2017.
28. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COURT NAVIGATION GUIDE FOR FREELANCE
WORKERS 2, 3, http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/Court-Navigation-Freelan
ce.pdf. [hereinafter N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COURT NAVIGATION GUIDE].
29. See N.Y.C. COUNCIL MINUTES, supra note 8.
30. See Fox, supra note 21.
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worker to provide any service. 31 FIFA entitles freelancers to written contracts
for any work exceeding $800 during a 120-day period, timely payment, and
freedom from retaliation. 32 FIFA further provides freelancers with, inter alia,
the right to file a complaint, the right to sue for double damages and attorney
fees, and the right to court navigation services, which provide assistance with
filing lawsuits against hiring parties, sample contracts, and information
regarding the differences in the classification of a freelancer and an
employee. 33
Although N.Y.C.’s freelancers ought to receive statutory protections
preventing payment theft, FIFA has serious issues. 34 The ambiguous
language of FIFA will likely have many unintended adverse consequences
for both freelancers and hiring parties, resulting in unnecessary confusion.35
As this legislation is the first of its kind in the United States and “represents
a major turning point for the gig economy,” 36 FIFA’s successful
implementation is critical. 37 This Note argues that while the protections for
freelance workers are necessary, FIFA does not properly address the needs
of freelancers or hiring parties.
This Note will explore and offer suggestions to resolve the ambiguity and
potential adverse ramifications of FIFA. Part I provides an in-depth history
of FIFA, its provisions, and its unique features. Part II discusses the
unintended consequences of FIFA on hiring parties, particularly the inherent
tension between FIFA and the N.Y.S. Court of Appeals’ decision in In re
Yoga Vida NYC, Inc., 38 which interpreted the meaning of “independent
contractor” just two days before FIFA was passed. Part II also explores the
unintended consequences of FIFA on freelancers and why the issues faced
by these workers will likely continue despite FIFA’s passage. Part III
provides suggestions for the N.Y.C. Council to consider when amending
FIFA, as well as guidelines for hiring parties—including hiring parties
located within N.Y.C. and hiring parties outside of N.Y.C. that contract with

31. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-927 (2017). This definition of a “hiring party” does not
include any federal, state, local, and foreign government entities, all of which are exempt from
FIFA. See id.
32. Id. §§ 20-928, 20-929, 20-930; R.C.N.Y. § 12-04 (2017).
33. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-931, 20-932; see generally Letherberry & Ahmad, supra note 11.
34. See, e.g., Reibstein et al., Defects, supra note 26.
35. Id.
36. Press Release, N.Y.C. Off. of the Mayor, Mayor Bill de Blasio Signs Legislation
Strengthening Protections for Freelance Workers (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-ofthe-mayor/news/890-16/mayor-bill-de-blasio-signs-legislation-strengthening-protectionsfreelance-workers (quoting Freelancers Union Founder and Executive Director Sara Horowitz).
37. See Sidney Minter, NYC’s “Freelance Isn’t Free Act” Might End Up Impacting Businesses
Across the Country, LEXOLOGY (June 22, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
57e2c03d-28c3-4bcb-84a7-597a125d2018; see also Gabrielle Levin & Neta Levanon, A Potentially
Far-Reaching Impact for NYC Freelance Law, LAW360 (May 12, 2017), https://www.law360.com/
articles/923171/a-potentially-far-reaching-impact-for-nyc-freelance-law.
38. See In re Yoga Vida NYC, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 1013 (2016).
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freelancers located within N.Y.C.—to consider adopting until FIFA’s issues
are addressed.
I. FIFA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PROVISIONS
In 2015, the Freelancers Union introduced FIFA as a proposed bill to the
N.Y.C. Council. 39 The Freelancers Union is not an actual union, but rather a
Brooklyn-based association established to promote the interests of its
350,000 members. 40 The Freelancers Union’s proposed bill, Intro. 10172015, 41 was backed by Councilmember Brad S. Lander as an “opportunity to
lead the nation in recognizing the vital contributions independent workers
make to our economy – by ensuring freelancers get real protections against
payment theft.” 42 “The City Council determined that protecting freelance
workers against non-payment would have a positive effect on the local
economy, the freelance industry, and the financial security of freelance
workers’ families, and result in a more prosperous city.” 43 Intro. 1017-2015,
named the Freelance Isn’t Free Act, was therefore unanimously approved by
a vote of the N.Y.C. Council in October 2016 and effective starting May 15,
2017. 44 Later, in July 2017, the N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs
augmented FIFA to include additional rules, in an attempt to clarify certain
provisions. 45
Since its enactment, FIFA has garnered global attention for being the first
law in the United States to ensure protections for freelancers against nonpayment. 46 This publicity has magnified the calls for better protection for
freelancers in the gig economy at the local, state, and federal levels. 47 The
39. See Laura Murphy, Freelance Isn’t Free Act Passes in NYC with 51 Votes!, FREELANCERS
UNION BLOG (Oct. 27, 2016), https://blog.freelancersunion.org/2016/10/27/freelanceisntfreepas
sed/.
40. About Us, FREELANCERS UNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/ (last visited Dec. 26,
2017).
41. See Legislative History Report, N.Y.C. COUNCIL (Nov. 17, 2016), http://legistar.council.ny
c.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2530972&GUID=61F8754B-80AF-493E-895ED6D17209776E.
42. First-of-its-Kind Legislation Will Crack Down on Nonpayment Epidemic Facing NYC’s 1.3
Million Independent Workers, N.Y.C. COUNCILMEMBER BRAD LANDER (Dec. 7, 2015), http://bra
dlander.nyc/news/updates/first-of-its-kind-legislation-will-crack-down-on-nonpayment-epidemicfacing-nyc-s-13-mi.
43. Notice of Public Hearing and Opportunity to Comment on Proposed Rules, N.Y.C. OFF. OF
THE MAYOR, DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFF. 2 (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downl
oads/pdf/media/DCAPublicHearing-053117.pdf.
44. See Bill Protecting NYC Freelancers from Deadbeat Companies Moves Forward with
Majority Support, supra note 13; see also N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COURT
NAVIGATION GUIDE, supra note 28, at 3.
45. See Implementation of Freelance Isn’t Free Act, N.Y.C. RULES, http://rules.cityofnewyork.
us/content/implementation-freelance-isnt-free-act (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
46. See, e.g., Emma Koehn, Calls for Australia to Follow “Home of Free Enterprise” New York
on Strict Late Payments Laws, SMARTCOMPANY (May 16, 2017), https://www.smartcompany.com.
au/finance/calls-for-australia-to-follow-new-york-on-late-payments/.
47. See Levin & Levanon, supra note 37.
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state of New Jersey, for example, currently has an assembly bill and a state
bill pending which would establish timely payment for freelancers. 48
Utilizing language similar to FIFA, this New Jersey legislation—namely,
Assembly Bill 4410 and Senate Bill 3530—requires a written contract
between freelancers and hiring parties for work exceeding a statutorilydefined amount of money, and creates a procedure for payment enforcement
as well as a court navigation program. 49
At the federal level, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) 2017 Strategic Enforcement Plan indicates its “new
priority to address issues related to complex employment relationships and
structures in the 21st century workplace, focusing specifically on . . .
independent contractor relations[] and the on-demand economy.” 50 The
EEOC’s characterization of the gig economy as an “emerging and developing
issue” and its identification of employee misclassification as an enforcement
priority is not surprising, 51 in light of emerging statutes, regulations, and the
well-publicized court cases against on-demand rideshare companies like
Uber and Lyft. 52 According to Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), who recently
introduced federal legislation that will act as a test drive for portable health
benefits for freelancers, “[p]olicymakers need to discuss whether government
and industry’s 20th Century definitions still work for a 21st Century economy
. . . . The decision about whether on-demand workers are independent
contractors or employees is too important to leave to the courts on a case-bycase, state-by-state basis.” 53 Public support and national attention suggest
that initiatives protecting freelancers in the gig economy will soon be passed
throughout the nation, thereby making FIFA’s effective implementation
critical. 54

48. Unlike FIFA, however, the proposed New Jersey legislation avoids many of the ambiguities
and issues found in FIFA that are discussed in this Note, like a good faith defense for hiring parties
who believed that they were in compliance with the law.
See Assemb., Bill No. A4410, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2016); S., Bill No. S3530, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017).
49. See Jeannie O’Sullivan, NJ Lawyers, Others Exempt from Proposed Freelancer Law,
LAW360 (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/986718?scroll=1.
50. U.S. EEOC, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2017-2021 2, https://ww
w.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep-2017.pdf.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Noam Scheiber, Uber Settles Cases with Concessions, But Drivers
Stay Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/technology
/uber-settles-cases-with-concessions-but-drivers-stay-freelancers.html; Rachel Emma Silverman,
Uber, Lyft Cases Focus on Drivers’ Legal Status, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2015, 5:55 PM), https://w
ww.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyft-cases-could-help-clarify-drivers-legal-status-1426456519.
53. Nancy Collamer, What Clinton And Trump Would Do for Gig Economy Workers, FORBES
(July 11, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2016/07/11/what-clinton-andtrump-would-do-for-gig-economy-workers/#1146d14e92dbl.
54. See Minter, supra note 37, at 5.

446

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 12

FIFA is administered by the Office of Labor Policy & Standards (OLPS)
within the N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs. 55 OLPS accepts
complaints from freelance workers alleging that hiring parties violated FIFA,
notifies hiring parties of complaints filed against them, and requests written
responses from the implicated hiring parties. 56 OLPS cannot issue
determinations or penalties, 57 but it can promote dispute resolution to keep
freelance claims outside the courts. 58 While it cannot provide legal advice, 59
OLPS provides information regarding rights and responsibilities under FIFA
and attorneys’ contact information for freelancers seeking to pursue claims
in court. 60
FIFA defines a “freelance worker” as “any natural person or any
organization composed of no more than one natural person, whether or not
incorporated or employing a trade name, that is hired or retained as an
independent contractor by a hiring party to provide services in exchange for
compensation.” 61 A supplemental rule added to FIFA in July 2017 provides
that qualifying freelancers are protected regardless of immigration status.62
Sales representatives, as defined by section 191-a of the New York Labor
Law, attorneys, and licensed medical professionals are explicitly excluded
and are not protected by FIFA. 63 Additionally, freelancers hired by any
federal, state, local, or foreign government are not protected by FIFA. 64
A. FREELANCER RIGHTS UNDER FIFA
The rights provided to qualifying freelancers under FIFA include the
right to 1) a written contract, 2) timely payment, 3) freedom from retaliation,
4) legal recourse, 5) double damage and attorney’s fees, 6) a court navigation
programs, and 7) subsequent rights added by supplemental rules. 65 Each of
these rights will be discussed in greater detail below.
1. Right to a Written Contract
Under FIFA, a written contract is required for any transaction where a
“hiring party retains the services of a freelance worker and the contract
between them has a value of $800 or more, either by itself or when aggregated
with all contracts for services” between the same parties during the
55. OLPS is referred to as the “office of labor standards” within FIFA. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF
CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COURT NAVIGATION GUIDE, supra note 28.
56. See FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 1.
57. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-931 (2017).
58. See id. § 20-936.
59. Id. § 20-932(e).
60. See FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 1.
61. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-927.
62. R.C.N.Y. § 12-02 (2017).
63. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-927.
64. Id. § 20-927; see FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 2.
65. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-927–20-936; R.C.N.Y. §§ 12-01–12-05.
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subsequent 120 days. 66 The hiring party must provide the written contract
which, at a minimum, must include: the name and mailing address of the
freelancer and the hiring party; an itemization of all services to be provided
by the freelancer; the value of the services to be provided; the rate and method
of the freelancer’s compensation; the date on which the freelancer must be
paid or the mechanism to determine the date of payment; and any additional
terms that OLPS may deem necessary in the future.67 The requirement for a
written contract is satisfied by any writing that contains FIFA’s required
terms and N.Y.S.’ requirements for a written contract. 68 According to the
Committee Report accompanying the bill prior to its passage, “an email, a
letter, an advertisement or a text message, or some combination of those” that
includes the required information will suffice. 69
2. Right to Timely Payment
FIFA provides that a hiring party must provide payment to a freelancer
in full (as stipulated by their written contract), either on or before the due date
specified in the written contract or, if no due date was specified, no later than
thirty days after the freelancer completes the work. 70
3. Right to Freedom from Retaliation
Under FIFA, hiring parties may not retaliate against freelancers by
penalizing, threatening, or blacklisting freelancers who exercise their
rights. 71 According to the Committee Report accompanying FIFA:
Examples of retaliation include blacklisting a freelance worker from an
industry, discrediting a freelance worker to other potential hiring parties or
canceling a multipart contract after the contracted work has begun. . . . [A]
claim of retaliation may also exist if, having established the terms of a
contract for freelance services, the hiring party cancels the agreement in
response to a request by the freelance worker to memorialize the agreement
in a written contract. 72

To prove retaliation under FIFA, a freelancer may present direct or
circumstantial evidence related to the hiring party’s intent to retaliate, such
as “evidence that the protected activity was closely followed by the adverse
action.” 73

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-928.
See id.
See N.Y.C. COMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 6.
Id.
See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-929.
Id. § 20-930.
N.Y.C. COMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 7.
R.C.N.Y. § 12-04(b) (2017).
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4. Right to Legal Recourse
Prior to seeking judicial action, an aggrieved freelancer may choose to
first file a complaint with OLPS within two years of an alleged violation. 74
Once an action is filed, the OLPS Director will send a certified letter to the
hiring party within twenty days, explaining how the hiring party allegedly
breached FIFA. 75 Within twenty days of receipt, the hiring party must
provide a written response to OLPS that either provides proof of payment to
the freelancer in full, or explains why the freelancer was not paid in full. 76
If the hiring party denies the allegations or fails to respond, OLPS will
notify the freelancer of his or her right to file a civil lawsuit in court.77 If the
hiring party does not respond to the complaint, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the hiring party committed the alleged violations. 78
Consequently, when the freelancer then initiates a lawsuit, the judge will
presume that the hiring party committed the violation alleged in the
freelancer’s complaint, and the hiring party will bear the burden to show that
it did not violate FIFA. 79
An aggrieved freelancer may decide to skip OLPS and immediately file
a civil lawsuit alleging FIFA violations in court.80 The statute of limitations
varies based on the claim: a claim for no written contract must be filed within
two years of the alleged violation,81 while a claim for nonpayment,
underpayment, or retaliation must be filed within six years of the alleged
violation. 82 A freelancer may commence an action to collect on small claims
of up to $5,000 in the N.Y.C. Civil Court. 83 Larger claims must be filed in
N.Y.C. Civil Court or the N.Y.S. Supreme Court. 84
5. Right to Double Damages and Attorney’s Fees
A freelancer who successfully asserts a claim under FIFA is entitled to
damages, including payments owed for the services provided by the
freelancer, double damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. 85 The damages
awarded will vary based on the claims asserted under FIFA. 86 A freelancer
74. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-931(a); see generally N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
COURT NAVIGATION GUIDE, supra note 28, at 5 (providing the benefits of first filing a complaint
with OLPS).
75. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-931(d).
76. Id. § 20-931(e)(1)(a)–(b).
77. See N.Y.C. COUNCIL MINUTES, supra note 8, at 3381, n.4 (citations omitted).
78. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-931(d).
79. See id.
80. See id. § 20-933; see also N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COURT NAVIGATION
GUIDE, supra note 28, at 5.
81. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-933(a)(2).
82. Id. § 20-933(a)(3).
83. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, COURT NAVIGATION GUIDE, supra note 28, at 10.
84. Id.
85. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-933(b).
86. Id.
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who commences a lawsuit solely alleging the hiring party’s failure to have a
written contract, and who can prove that the hiring party refused to enter into
a written contract, may recover statutory damages of $250 from the hiring
party. 87 A freelancer who commences and prevails on a claim alleging the
hiring party’s failure to have a written contract, plus another claim under
FIFA, such as failure to provide payment or retaliation, may be awarded
statutory damages equal to the value of the contract, as well as any other
available relief. 88 If, for example, a freelancer prevails on a claim alleging
the hiring party’s failure to have a written contract and another claim alleging
the hiring party’s failure to make full payment, the freelancer is entitled to
double damages, injunctive relief, and “such other remedies as may be
appropriate.” 89 Additionally, a freelancer who prevails on a claim of
retaliation may receive statutory damages equal to the value of the contract.90
FIFA also provides increased statutory damages against hiring parties
with patterns of abuse. 91 Under FIFA, the Corporation Counsel of the N.Y.C.
Law Department (Corporation Counsel) may pursue a claim against hiring
parties with repeated violations. 92 If the Corporation Counsel decides that
there is reasonable belief that a hiring party is engaged in a pattern or practice
of violating its obligations under FIFA, the Corporation Counsel may
commence a civil action against that hiring party. 93 FIFA provides that a
hiring party may face a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for repeated FIFA
violations, along with all other available penalties. 94
6. Right to a Court Navigation Program
FIFA established a Court Navigation Program run by OLPS, which
provides the public with general information regarding FIFA’s requirements,
classification of workers as employees as opposed to independent
contractors, how to initiate a court case, court forms, a sample written
contract, and how to find an attorney. 95
7. Subsequent Rights Added by Supplemental Rules
On July 24, 2017, the N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs
augmented FIFA with additional rules intended to “clarify provisions in the
law, establish requirements to implement and meet the goals of the law, and
provide guidance to covered hiring parties and protected freelance
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. § 20-933(b)(2)(a).
Id. § 20-933(b)(3)–(4).
See id. § 20-933(b)(3).
See id. § 20-933(b)(4).
See id. § 20-934(b).
See id. § 20-934(a)(1)–(3).
See id.
Id. § 20-934(b).
See id. § 20-932.
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workers.” 96 These rules significantly expanded FIFA’s coverage. 97 For
example, the rules broaden the definition of retaliation by extending liability
to hiring parties for adverse actions taken by that “hiring party, their actual
or apparent agent, or any other person acting directly or indirectly on behalf
of a hiring party . . . .” 98 The rules further allow a freelancer to establish that
the “cause” element of a retaliation claim was an exercise of rights under
FIFA that was “a motivating factor” for the adverse action, even if it was not
the sole factor. 99 In other words, a “motivating factor” standard, rather than
a “but-for” standard, will be applied in FIFA retaliation claims. 100
Importantly, the rules also limit the rights that a freelancer can waive in
a contract. 101 While FIFA’s initial legislation indicated that any contractual
provision waiving rights granted under FIFA would be void, 102 the rules
expansively provide that the following contractual limitations will be
declared void: any prospective waiver or limitation of rights under FIFA; 103
a waiver of class or collective actions; 104 a waiver of “any procedural right
normally afford to a party in a civil or administrative action;”105 or any
confidentiality provision that would prevent a freelance worker from
disclosing the contract’s terms to the OLPS Director. 106
II. FIFA’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
As noted by Sara Horowitz, the founder and executive director of the
Freelancers Union, the landmark protections provided to freelancers under
FIFA will hopefully “have a prophylactic effect of making sure” that hiring
parties stop shortchanging freelancers. 107 However, as discussed below,
96. Implementation of Freelance Isn’t Free Act, supra note 45.
97. See Leni D. Battaglia & Richard G. Rosenblatt, NYC Consumer Affairs Department Adopts

Final Rules on Freelance Isn’t Free Act, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (July 20, 2017),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/nyc-consumer-affairs-department-adopts-final-rules-onfreelance-isnt-free-act; see also Cindy Schmitt Minniti & Mark S. Goldstein, United States: NYC
Agency Publishes Rules for New Independent Contractor Law, REED SMITH LLP (July 19, 2017),
https://www.employmentlawwatch.com/2017/07/articles/employment-us/new-york-employmentbeat/nyc-agency-publishes-rules-for-new-independent-contractor-law/?utm_source=Mondaq&ut.
98. R.C.N.Y. § 12-01(b) (2017).
99. Id.
100. See id.; Ned Bassen et al., New NYC Rules for Hiring Domestic Workers and Other
Freelancers as Independent Contractors, HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED LLP (July 27, 2017),
https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/new-nyc-rules-for-hiring-domestic-workers-and-otherfreelancers-as-independent-contractors.
101. See Battaglia & Rosenblatt, supra note 97.
102. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-935 (2017) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law, any provision of a contract purporting to waive rights under this chapter is void as
against public policy.”
103. R.C.N.Y. § 12-05(a).
104. Id. § 12-05(b).
105. Id. § 12-05(c).
106. Id. § 12-05(d).
107. See Rebekah Mintzer, Freelancers Hail Safeguards in Bill Passed by NYC Council,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 2016, at 1.
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FIFA currently contains ambiguities which will impede its effectiveness. If
the ambiguous language is not amended or clarified, FIFA will have many
adverse and unintended consequences on both hiring parties and freelancers.
A. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR HIRING PARTIES
1. Misclassification of “Independent Contractor” Arising
from Unclear Statutory and Judicial Interpretations
Employee misclassification occurs when a hiring party improperly labels
an employee as an independent contractor or fails to report the employee in
any capacity (i.e., paying workers “off the books”). 108 FIFA disclaims that it
does not provide a determination about the legal classification of any
individual and does not address what will occur in misclassification
disputes. 109 However, a hiring party must first and foremost be aware of
whether the worker retained is an independent contractor subject to FIFA or
if that worker is, in fact, acting as an employee.
Classification as an independent contractor versus an employee has
major consequences for both workers and employers because workers
classified as “independent contractors” are not guaranteed the critical
benefits and protections awarded to employees. 110 In particular, independent
contractors do not receive benefits such as: minimum wage, overtime, rest
breaks, expense reimbursement, family and medical leave, unemployment
insurance, workers’ compensation, or the right to form a union. 111 On a
broader scale, employee misclassification generates substantial losses to the
government in the form of lower tax revenues, as well as to state
unemployment insurance funds and workers’ compensation funds. 112
Hiring parties found to have misclassified workers are consequently
punished with both federal and state penalties through the Internal Revenue
Service, U.S. Department of Labor, and various N.Y.S. agencies. 113 Hiring
parties in N.Y.S. must be especially careful to properly classify their workers,
as N.Y.S. aggressively investigates, identifies, and prosecutes independent
contractor misclassification. 114 Since its establishment in 2007, the New
York State Joint Enforcement Task Force on Employee Misclassification
108. N.Y. DEP’T OF LAB., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION 2 (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.labor.ny.gov/agencyinfo/PDFs/Mis
classification-Task-Force-Report-2-1-2015.pdf.
109. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-935(d) (2017).
110. See Wendi S. Lazar, The Gig Economy: A Threat to Basic Employment Rights; Employees
in the Workplace, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 2017, at 3.
111. See, e.g., Leevson v. Aqualife USA, Inc., No. 14-CV-6905, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181388,
at *22–25 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-3868 (2d Cir. 2017).
112. See id. at *10 (citing Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/).
113. See Fox, supra note 21.
114. See id.
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(JETF) has fought worker exploitation and employee misclassification by
prosecuting employers who break the law. 115 In 2014, the JETF identified
nearly 26,000 instances of employee misclassification, almost $316 million
in unreported wages, and nearly $8.8 million in unemployment insurance
contributions. 116
Hiring parties must carefully determine a worker’s classification to
properly provide benefits where required and avoid penalties, but
determining one’s worker classification is no easy task. No single
determinative test for worker classification exists. 117 Instead, several
different tests may be used to distinguish independent contractors from
employees. 118 The applicable legal tests for making this determination
changes from context to context, keeping in mind that different courts and
agencies apply different definitions, rules, and tests. 119 Particularly for gig
economy workers, the existing tests for classification determinations
inconsistently apply independent contractor and employee designations. 120
According to scholars Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, the new
workforce arising from the gig economy does not easily fit into the existing
legal definitions of “independent contractor” and “employee.” 121 Issues
surrounding worker classification in the gig economy have perhaps been
most publicized regarding application-based, on-demand ridesharing
115. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.159 (2016).
116. N.Y. DEP’T. OF LAB., supra note 108, at 2.
117. Pamela A. Izvanariu, Matters Settled But Not Resolved: Worker Misclassification in the

Rideshare Sector, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 145–46 (2016); see Fox, supra note 21 (explaining that
“there is no ‘magic combination’ for ensuring the factors will weigh in favor of the workers being
classified as independent contractors”).
118. Courts and administrative agencies will apply different tests when determining worker
classification, depending on the type of claim alleged. In New York, courts may apply the “totality
of circumstances/economic reality test,” the “common law right to control test,” or a hybrid of both.
Compare Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2017) (utilizing the
economic reality test in a Fair Labor Standards Act claim to find that drivers were independent
contractors and thus not entitled to overtime pay), with In re Yoga Vida NYC, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 1013,
1015–16 (2016) (utilizing the right to control test in an unemployment insurance claim to find that
yoga instructors were independent contractors and thus not entitled to unemployment insurance).
119. Izvanariu, supra note 117, at 145–46.
120. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for TwentyFirst-Century Work: The “Independent Worker” 2 (Dec. 2015) (discussion paper), available at
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_w
ork_krueger_harris.pdf.
121. See id. at 2, 5, 7 (proposing a new legal category called “independent workers” who would
qualify for many of the protections that employees receive, including the freedom to organize and
collectively bargain, civil rights protections, tax withholding, and employer contributions for payroll
taxes, but would not qualify for hours-based employee benefits such as overtime, minimum wage,
and unemployment insurance benefits); but see Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber Business
Model Does Not Justify a New ‘Independent Worker’ Category, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.epi.org/publication/uber-business-model-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-workercategory/. Eisenbrey and Mishel refute Harris and Krueger’s argument because “[r]ather than pursue
a legislative fix . . . a better approach is simply to establish that Uber and Lyft drivers and similar
workers are employees with all attendant rights.” Id.
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companies, like Uber and Lyft, which have faced lawsuits from drivers
challenging their classification as independent contractors. 122
When determining whether to classify a party as an independent
contractor or an employee, N.Y.C. employers must consider federal law,
N.Y.S. statutes, and more recently, city laws established under FIFA, as well
as courts’ future interpretations of FIFA. Because worker classification is a
complex area of law, 123 hiring parties—particularly individual employers and
small companies lacking the resources to regularly consult legal experts—
struggle to determine whether to classify their workers as employees or
freelancers. 124 Even hiring parties that can afford to consult attorneys may
still face employee-independent contractor classification issues due to the
tension between FIFA and the Yoga Vida decision entered by the N.Y.S.
Court of Appeals on October 25, 2016, only two days before FIFA was
passed. 125
In Yoga Vida, the N.Y.S. Court of Appeals considered whether certain
yoga instructors in a Manhattan yoga studio were independent contractors or
employees. 126 The yoga instructors argued that they were employees and
thereby entitled to unemployment insurance from the yoga studio. 127
Reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and the intermediate
appellate court’s finding that the yoga instructors were employees, the Court
of Appeals held that the yoga instructors were independent contractors, not

122. In a 2015 decision holding that whether a Lyft driver is an employee or an independent
contractor is a question to be resolved by a jury, the judge wrote:
[T]he jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two
round holes. The test the California courts have developed over the 20th Century for
classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem. . . .
Perhaps Lyft drivers who work more than a certain number of hours should be employees
while the others should be independent contractors. Or perhaps Lyft drivers should be
considered a new category of worker altogether, requiring a different set of protections.
But absent legislative intervention, California’s outmoded test for classifying workers
will apply in cases like this. And because the test provides nothing remotely close to a
clear answer, it will often be for juries to decide.
Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–
82 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
123. See Elizabeth A. Harlan, Service Providers as Independent Contractors or Employees—The
Yoga Vida Decision, 2017 LEXISNEXIS: EMERGING ISSUES 7502 (Jan. 11, 2017).
124. See N.Y. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 108, at 2 (noting that in 2014, the state government
“identified nearly 26,000 instances of employee misclassification; discovered nearly $316 million
in unreported wages; and assessed nearly $8.8 million in unemployment insurance contributions”).
125. Nina K. Markey, Continuing Uncertainty for Employers Seeking to Navigate Joint
Employment Liability, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 14, 2017, 12:45 PM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/11/14/continuinguncertainty-for-employers-seeking-to-navigate-joint-employment-liability/.
126. See In re Yoga Vida NYC, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 1013, 1014–15 (2016).
127. See id.
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employees, of the studio. 128 The yoga studio was thus not liable for the
alleged unpaid unemployment contributions. 129
In its decision, the Court of Appeals examined multiple factors to
determine whether the workers were independent contractors or employees
under N.Y.S. law. 130 The most important factors were whether the yoga
studio exercised supervision, direction, and control over the workers. 131 In
Yoga Vida, on-staff yoga instructors created their own schedules; they chose
whether to be paid hourly or on a percentage basis; they did not have to attend
staff meetings; they could work for competitors; and, notably, they were paid
only if a certain number of students attended their classes, unlike staff
instructors who were paid regardless of attendance. 132 The Court of Appeals
explained that the yoga studio did not exercise sufficient supervision,
direction, and control to constitute an employer-employee relationship.
The Court of Appeals’ fact-intensive analysis in Yoga Vida, as well as
the dissenting opinion asserting that the yoga instructors should have been
deemed employees, demonstrates that worker classification is a subjective,
fact-specific analysis that is often difficult to ascertain. 133 Accordingly, the
analysis employed by the Court of Appeals in Yoga Vida will likely not assist
hiring parties in determining classifications in different contexts, particularly
those hiring parties who may be engaged in the gig economy’s online
platforms.
2. Tension with Yoga Vida Regarding Payments for
Freelancers
Even when it is clear that an individual was acting as a freelancer and not
as an employee, and the parties properly entered into a written contract
pursuant to FIFA, payment issues may arise if the freelancer completes work
that does not meet the hiring party’s approval. 134 FIFA requires payment to
any freelancer regardless of work product. 135 Section 20-929 of FIFA does
not include a good faith defense for hiring parties and instead requires that

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 1014–16.
See id.
See id. at 1015–16.
See id.
See id. at 1015.
See id. at 1016–18 (Fahey, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board and the Appellate Division’s finding that the yoga instructors should have been
classified as employees based on the facts).
134. See Loren Lee Forrest Jr. & Katherine H. Marques, Why NY Employers Should Carefully
Consider Freelancers, LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/875140/why-nyemployers-should-carefully-consider-freelancers; see also Loren Forrest, Jr. & Katherine H.
Marques, Employers’ Use of Independent Contractors Restricted By New Law and Court Decision,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.hklaw.com/publications/Employers-Useof-Independent-Contactors-Restricted-by-New-Law-and-Court-Decision-12-12-2016/.
135. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-929 (2017).
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hiring parties pay freelancers, even if the freelancers’ work is substandard. 136
This provision of FIFA directly conflicts with the Court of Appeals’ decision
in Yoga Vida. 137 When explaining why some of Yoga Vida’s instructors were
independent contractors, the Court of Appeals noted that “[u]nlike staff
instructors, who are paid regardless of whether anyone attends a class, the
non-staff instructors are paid only if a certain number of students attend their
classes.” 138 In accordance with Yoga Vida, hiring parties are not obligated to
pay independent contractors who do not perform the work that the parties had
agreed upon. 139 This directly conflicts with the FIFA provision that requires
hiring parties pay independent contractors, regardless of performance or
quality. 140 Because FIFA lacks a provision for resolving performance issues,
hiring parties are left with no power regarding performance and quality
control, thereby conflicting with the Yoga Vida decision. 141
3. Issues with Freelancers Operating under Trade Names and
Legal Entities
In addition to the general issues surrounding employee versus
independent contractor classification, the definition of a freelancer under
FIFA is complicated because a hiring party may not realize that an individual
is a freelancer. 142 FIFA defines a freelance worker as any natural person or
organization. 143 But, an independent contractor may operate individually or
under a trade name or legal entity (such as an LLC). Importantly, FIFA
applies to individuals regardless of whether they have incorporated a business
for their operation. 144 Therefore, an LLC will be covered as a “freelance
worker” under FIFA when that LLC consists of one individual. 145
The N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs has confirmed that
“[i]ndividuals may qualify as freelance workers under [FIFA] even if they

136. See id.; see also Richard J. Reibstein et al., New York City Freelancer Law May Have
Nationwide Impact on Independent Contractor Relationships, 42 EMP. REL. L. J. 30, 30–31 (2016)
[hereinafter Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact] (noting that FIFA lacks a good faith defense to the
double damages penalty in the law); Todd Lebowitz, New NYC Law Requires Written Agreements
for Solo Contractors, Even Nannies and Babysitters!, BAKER HOSTETLER (May 19, 2017),
https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/2017/05/new-nyc-law-requires-written-agreementsfor-solo-contractors-even-nannies-and-babysitters/ (explaining that “it is unclear whether the Act
[FIFA] will recognize a good faith defense for a hiring party who believes the contractor failed to
perform”).
137. Employers’ Use of Independent Contractors Restricted By New Law and Court Decision,
supra note 134.
138. In re Yoga Vida, 28 N.Y.3d at 1016.
139. See id.
140. Why NY Employers Should Carefully Consider Freelancers, supra note 134.
141. See Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact, supra note 136.
142. See Lebowitz, supra note 136.
143. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-927 (2017).
144. See id.
145. See id.; see also FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 2.
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are incorporated or use a trade name.” 146 As noted by legal practitioners,
many freelancers operating under trade names are reluctant to disclose that
they are one-person operations; these individual freelancers strategically state
that “‘we’ have done this or that, or that ‘our’ services include this.” 147 To an
outsider, freelancers using trade names appear to be outside of FIFA’s scope.
Hiring parties may later encounter issues if they fail to enter into a written
contract simply because they were not aware of the freelancer’s status due to
the freelancer’s use of a trade name or entity. 148
4. Lack of Jurisdictional Scope
Critically, FIFA lacks jurisdictional limitations since it does not precisely
identify whom it covers and whom it regulates. 149 FIFA’s definitions of
freelance workers and hiring parties are ambiguous and the scope of FIFA’s
coverage is not currently defined. 150 FIFA does not clarify whether
individuals must have physical locations in N.Y.C., mailing addresses in
N.Y.C., or simply conduct business regularly in N.Y.C., in order to meet
FIFA’s definition of freelance workers or hiring parties. 151 FIFA may apply
to work performed outside N.Y.C. depending on the particular circumstance,
including whether some of the work is performed in N.Y.C., whether the
freelance worker was hired or retained in N.Y.C., and whether the hiring
party’s operations are within N.Y.C.. 152
Moreover, FIFA does not address any of the issues that will inevitably
arise when hiring parties retain freelancers via the Internet. Future litigation
will likely determine whether FIFA applies to N.Y.C. freelancers who are
retained over the Internet by hiring parties located in other states, or even
other countries.
The N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs has recognized FIFA’s
ambiguity and noted that its scope will need to be addressed by the courts. 153
Specifically, in response to the question, “Can the Law apply outside of New
York City?,” the N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs acknowledged:
It depends. The Freelance Isn’t Free Act is a New York City law. While
judges will decide how the Law applies in each case, the Law does apply to
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 2.
Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact, supra note 136, at 31.
See id.
See id.
See id.; see also Scheiber, As Freelancers’ Ranks Grow, supra note 10 (noting the proposed
bill “would cover workers who live in New York City; there is some ambiguity about whether it
would apply to workers who live outside the city but work for companies based in the city”).
151. See Reibstein et al., Defects, supra note 26; see also FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 3.
152. See Matthew Lampe et al., Avoid the Pitfalls of NYC Freelancer Law, JONES DAY (June
2017), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/a0ac8b81-677e-4c94-932e-815c19023a33/Pres
entation/PublicationAttachment/4a0b7641-c0da-4b69-bf5b-9eb5f40145c2/Avoid%20the%20Pitf
alls%20of%20NYC%20Freelancer%20Law-.pdf.
153. See FIFA FAQ, supra note 7, at 3.
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work performed inside New York City and may apply to work performed
outside New York City depending on the overall circumstances. For
example, whether the Law applies may depend on whether some, but not
all, of the work is performed in New York City, the freelance worker is
hired or retained in New York City, or the hiring party has significant
operations in New York City. 154

Judicial and administrative decisions may find that “[t]he law applies to
any business that has a freelance worker located in New York City, and the
hiring party need not be based or doing business in New York City.” 155 Thus,
because of FIFA’s ambiguities, even individuals outside of N.Y.C.’s
jurisdiction may unknowingly be subject to FIFA’s requirements.
5. No Waivers and Potential Preemption
FIFA provides that any contract purporting to waive or limit a
freelancer’s rights under the Act will automatically be deemed void as a
matter of law pursuant to public policy. 156 FIFA furthers that a contract may
not waive or limit a freelancer’s right to participate in a class action. 157 These
provisions would therefore prohibit a contractual provision which states, for
example, that the parties must proceed with arbitration instead of litigation in
the event of a dispute. 158 However, the Department of Consumer Affairs may
not have the authority to void contractual arbitration provisions, as FIFA’s
limit on contractual waivers is likely pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA). 159 The FAA supports the use of arbitration agreements for the
arbitration of commercial contracts claims. 160 In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a “state law prohibits
outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, . . . [t]he conflicting rule
is displaced by the FAA . . . . States cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated purposes.” 161

154. Id.
155. Danielle Manley, FIFA: This New Law May Affect Businesses Nationwide, MULTIBRIEFS

(May 15, 2017) (quoting David Singer, Esq., Partner and labor and employment expert at the
international law firm Dorsey & Whitney, LLP), http://exclusive.multibriefs.com/content/fifa-thisnew-law-may-affect-businesses-nationwide/business-management-services-risk-management.
156. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-935(a) (2017); R.C.N.Y. § 12-05(a) (2017).
157. “If a contract includes language that waives or limits a freelance worker’s right to participate
in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding, said
waiver or limitation is void.” R.C.N.Y. § 12-05(b).
158. See Gena B. Usenheimer & Meredith-Anne Berger, Newly Adopted “Freelance Isn’t Free”
Rules Rife with Preemption Issues Under FAA, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (July 13, 2017),
http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA071317-LE.
159. See id.; see also Battaglia & Rosenblatt, supra note 97.
160. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
161. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341, 351 (2011).
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Under Concepcion 162 and ensuing cases, 163 the Supreme Court has
aggressively enforced arbitration agreements containing class action
waivers. 164 The exact scope of FIFA’s prohibition on waivers is unclear 165
and will likely need to be resolved by the courts.
6. Unnecessary Confusion, Litigation, and Forced Settlements
The expansive and potentially crippling statutory remedies that may be
awarded against hiring parties will likely result in increased litigation. 166
Because FIFA does not specify the jurisdiction regarding its coverage, hiring
parties with N.Y.C. mailing addresses or physical locations in N.Y.C., and
hiring parties who use freelancers from N.Y.C., may face liability under
FIFA. 167 At the public hearing prior to FIFA’s passage, proponents testified
that legal action is onerous, expensive and time-consuming with the results
too uncertain. 168 FIFA therefore aimed to lessen the need for litigation. 169
Unfortunately, however, litigation will likely continue as the public attempts
to determine FIFA’s scope through judicial interpretation, resulting in breach
of contract cases which could have been avoided through clearer drafting.
FIFA may lead many hiring parties, seeking to avoid additional expenses and
an uncertain outcome in the courts, to settle. Settlements beneficially keep
breach of contract cases out of the courts; however, hiring parties should not
be forced to settle when they have a good faith defense or when they are not
certain if FIFA applies to them.
B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR FREELANCERS
Undoubtedly, the legislative protections offered by FIFA are
necessary. 170 As noted by FIFA’s lead sponsor, Councilmember Brad S.
Lander, existing laws are “so badly outdated they don’t give the basic
protections all workers expect, much less broader support and benefits to all
162. Id.; see generally Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012).
163. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“courts must
‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms”).
164. See Frankel v. Citicorp Ins. Servs., No. 11-CV-2293 (NGG) (RER), 2015 WL 6021534, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2015) (noting that the rule established by the Supreme Court in Concepcion
and Italian Colors Restaurant “applies just as strongly to class action waivers within arbitration
agreements”).
165. Usenheimer & Berger, supra note 158.
166. See Reibstein et al., Defects, supra note 26.
167. Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact, supra note 136, at 30–31.
168. See Hearing of the N.Y.C. Consumer Affairs Committee, Hearing Transcript 7, 143 (Feb.
29, 2016) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Consumer Affairs Committee Hearing].
169. See id. at 53–54.
170. According to a LinkedIn study, 75% of its “ProFinder professionals” surveyed agreed that
legislation like FIFA is needed for the freelance workforce. LinkedIn ProFinder Reveals Brand New
Findings on Freelance Economy, LINKEDIN (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/profinde
r/blog/linkedin-profinder-reveals-brand-new-findings-on-freelance-economy.
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workers in the growing gig economy.” 171 However, FIFA will likely have
many unintended consequences, which may ultimately harm the freelancers
it sought to protect. 172 First, FIFA does not actually save freelancers from the
inconvenient requirement of having to turn to the court system. 173 FIFA still
requires that freelancers turn to the court system to collect fees,174 but going
through the courts is timely and costly, and can be a reputational risk for both
freelancers and hiring parties. Freelancers need more than just another way
to get into the court system.
Among FIFA’s many supporters were union organizations that
commended FIFA’s laudable goals, 175 although unions often believe that the
best protection for workers is through classification as an employee, and the
ultimate legislative push should be towards classifying more individuals as
employees. 176 Indeed, some on-demand companies have willingly, and
successfully, opted to classify their independent contractors as “employees,”
which ensures rights and protections for workers better than independent
contractor designations. 177 For example, the on-demand food preparation and
delivery service, Munchery, opted to classify its drivers as employees after
its first two years of existence. 178 Because of their initial classification as
independent contractors, Munchery’s drivers were not eligible for minimum
wage and overtime protections, unemployment insurance, or workers’
compensation. 179 In 2013, Munchery willingly decided to switch its drivers’
171. See Scheiber, As Freelancers’ Ranks Grow, supra note 10.
172. Amit S. Bagga, Deputy Commissioner of External Affairs for the N.Y.C. Department of

Consumer Affairs, raised several concerns regarding FIFA’s effect on freelancers prior to the
FIFA’s passage. See N.Y.C. Consumer Affairs Committee Hearing, supra note 168, at 38–48.
173. See Reibstein et al., Defects, supra note 26.
174. See id.
175. A few of FIFA’s many supporters were the United Federation of Teachers, National Writers
Union, and Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ (SEIU 32BJ). See In Landmark
Victory, Millions of NYC Gig Economy Workers Win Wage Theft Protections, N.Y.C.
COUNCILMEMBER BRAD LANDER (Oct. 27, 2016), http://bradlander.nyc/news/updates/inlandmark-victory-millions-of-nyc-gig-economy-workers-win-wage-theft-protections.
176. For example, FIFA was supported by the Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ
(SEIU 32BJ). See id. The SEUU 32BJ is a national union consisting of 163,000 property service
workers in the United States. But, SEIU has noted in the past that it encourages broader protections
for workers, aiming to have workers classified as employees rather than freelancers. In opposition
to a New Jersey state bill that would provide portable benefits to freelancers, SEIU 32BJ Vice
President Kevin Brown explained, “[w]hile we appreciate . . . trying to make sure these workers are
paid a decent living and have access to health benefits, it takes away their employee status . . . while
we would want [workers] to be treated fairly . . . in terms of their compensation, we can’t
compromise their rights as workers in the process.” Michael Hill, Assembly Bill Would Create
Benefits System for Contract and Freelance Workers, NJTV NEWS (June 22, 2017),
https://www.njtvonline.org/news/video/assembly-bill-create-benefits-system-contract-freelanceworkers/.
177. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, A Middle Ground Between Contract Worker and Employee, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/a-middle-ground-betweencontract-worker-and-employee.html?_r=1.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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classification to employees. 180 Although the upfront costs of classifying its
drivers as employees were high, Munchery recognized that classifying its
workers as employees was best in the long-term to prevent turnover. 181
Today, this successful on-demand company is still in operation and delivers
meals to over 1,000 cities. 182
III.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE FIFA’S
AMBIGUITY
A. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO CLARIFY FIFA

To evaluate whether amendments to this landmark legislation are
required, the N.Y.C. Council included a provision within FIFA allowing the
N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs—through OLPS—to “examine the
trends in New York City’s gig economy and to promote policies that will
benefit our evolving workforce.” 183 This provision specifically requires that
OLPS prepare reports based on collected data regarding the resolutions
obtained as a result of FIFA, which will be presented to the N.Y.C. Council
for the first time one year after enactment and on the first of November every
five years thereafter. 184 Councilmember Brad S. Lander explained, in
response to critics, “[s]ince this legislation is the first of its kind, we wrote
into the law an opportunity for a ‘check-in,’ one year from the enactment
date, in which the Department of Consumer Affairs will report the results of
its complaint procedure, and make recommendations for any legislative
changes.” 185 Therefore, on or about May 15, 2018, OLPS will report FIFA’s
results and make recommendations for potential legislative changes. 186 At
that time or prior, policymakers should, at the very least, consider amending
FIFA to include a specific jurisdictional provision, an unambiguous
definition of a freelance worker, and a good faith defense provision for hiring
parties regarding work quality.

180. See id.
181. According to Munchery’s Vice-President for Operations Kris Fredrickson, “on a 1099

model, it’s tougher to compel [the drivers] to show up.” Id.
182. MUNCHERY, https://munchery.com/food-near-me/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
183. Press Release, N.Y.C. Off. of the Mayor, Mayor Bill de Blasio Signs Legislation
Strengthening Protections for Freelance Workers (Nov. 16, 2016) (quoting N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Consumer Affairs Commissioner Lorelei Salas), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news
/890-16/mayor-bill-de-blasio-signs-legislation-strengthening-protections-freelance-workers.
184. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-936 (2017).
185. Brad S. Lander, Freelancer Bill is Smart Law, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 2016, at 6 (responding to
Reibstein et al., Defects, supra note 26).
186. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-936(c).
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1. Amending FIFA to Include a Specific Jurisdictional
Provision
FIFA must be amended to confirm whether it applies to the hiring parties
and/or freelancers within N.Y.C. Both hiring parties and freelancers should
not be forced to wait for court determinations to confirm FIFA’s
jurisdictional limits.
2. Amending FIFA to Clarify the Definition of a Freelance
Worker
The definition of a “freelance worker” should be amended so that hiring
parties are not inappropriately penalized for failure to prepare a written
contract when the hiring parties were unaware because the freelancers
operated under an entity or trade name and did not disclose their status.
3. Amending FIFA to Include a Good Faith Provision
FIFA should be amended to include a good faith provision pertaining to
work quality and performance disputes, which would be consistent with the
N.Y.S. Court of Appeals’ decision in Yoga Vida. Specifically, there should
be a good faith defense to protect hiring parties with a good faith belief that
the freelancers’ services were not performed satisfactorily. 187 Additionally, a
good faith defense should exist for hiring parties who were not aware that the
freelancers qualified for FIFA protections. For example, this would apply
when a freelancer operates under a trade name and does not disclose that to
the hiring party and as a result, the hiring party does not provide a written
contract to the freelancer based on a good faith belief that a written contract
pursuant to FIFA was not required. Notably, the pending New Jersey state
legislation pertaining to freelance workers includes a good faith provision
which will protect hiring parties when necessary. 188 The proposed New
Jersey statute provides: “In addition to any remedies provided pursuant to
any other laws of this State, the commissioner may assess against the client
an additional amount as liquidated damages, unless the client proves a good
faith basis for believing that its violation was in compliance with this act.” 189
Other existing statutes pertaining to employees provide employers with
good faith defenses that allow the employers to dispute payments owed to
employees. 190 For example, N.Y.S. Labor Law provides a defense for
employers facing a double damages penalty if the employer can prove that it
had a good faith basis for believing that it did not owe the employee
187. See Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact, supra note 136, at 33–34.
188. See Assemb., Bill No. A4410, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2016); S., Bill No. S3530, 217th Leg. (N.J.

2017).
189. S., Bill No. S3530, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017) (emphasis added); Assemb., Bill No. A4410,
217th Leg. (N.J. 2016).
190. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198.1-a (McKinney 2016); 29 U.S.C. § 259 (2012).
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compensation. 191 Similarly, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act includes a
good faith provision allowing a defendant-employer to avoid liability for
failure to pay overtime if the defendant-employer “pleads and proves that the
act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in
reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or
interpretation” of the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor. 192 FIFA should be amended to include a good faith
provision, like those incorporated within other federal and state laws related
to employment. 193
The original proposed draft of FIFA included a good faith provision to
protect hiring parties; however, this provision was removed from the final
adopted legislation. 194 This original good faith provision specified: “This
provision does not preclude the settlement of a good faith dispute regarding
performance under the contract or preclude a modification for a contract in
accordance with other applicable law.”195 A similar good faith provision
should be added into FIFA.
B. SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR HIRING PARTIES UNTIL FIFA IS
AMENDED
Until FIFA is amended or the courts clarify FIFA’s jurisdictional
coverage, hiring parties with any connection to N.Y.C. should assume that
FIFA applies to them. 196 As legislation, rule-making, and litigation
surrounding FIFA continues, hiring parties should consider taking the
following preventative measures to limit liability, such as confirming
whether prospective hires and current workers are freelancers or employees,
execute written contracts with freelancers, pay freelancers timely, and take
proper action if a complaint is filed with OLPS.
1. Confirm Whether Workers Are Freelancers under FIFA’s
Protections or Employees
Hiring parties should consider reviewing their relationships with workers
to confirm whether they are correctly identified as independent contractors
or whether an employee status is more appropriate. Pursuant to the Yoga Vida
decision, the actual duties performed by the worker should be examined, 197
191.
192.
193.
194.

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198.1-a.
29 U.S.C. § 259.
See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198.1-a; 29 U.S.C. § 259.
See N.Y.C. COMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION 12 (Feb. 29, 2016); see also New York City’s “Freelance Isn’t
Free Act (FIFA)” is a Trap for Unwary Employers, DDK & COMPANY, LLP (Feb. 23, 2017), https
://www.ddkcpas.com/new-york-citys-freelance-isnt-free-act-fifa-is-a-trap-for-unwary-employers.
195. COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, supra note 194, at 12.
196. Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact, supra note 136, at 36.
197. See In re Yoga Vida NYC, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 1013, 1016 (2016).
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rather than the title or position that may have been contractually agreed upon
between the parties. 198 While FIFA disclaims that it does not provide a
determination about the legal classification of any individual and does not
address what will occur in misclassification disputes, 199 hiring parties should
ensure that they meet FIFA’s minimum requirements as well as the strict
federal and state laws pertaining to worker classification. 200
Courts and agencies may consider a variety of factors, but as
demonstrated by Yoga Vida, the following factors play a critical role in
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor versus an
employee: the degree to which the employer controls or directs the manner
in which the work is performed; whether the worker can simultaneously
perform services for other companies; the extent of the worker’s duties; the
opportunity for profit or loss; whether the worker’s duties are performed for
the employer on an ongoing or permanent basis; whether the worker hires
supervisors or subordinates; whether the services performed by the worker
are an integral part of the employer’s business; whether the service performed
by the worker is for a fixed term; and, the extent of the worker’s investment
in equipment or materials needed to perform the job. 201 Employers should
therefore review their independent contractor versus employee job
descriptions, actual job duties and functions, and the degree of day-to-day
control exerted by management. An employer who is uncertain about a
worker’s classification should err on the side of caution and identify the
worker as an employee, given that one study commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Labor found that 95% of workers who claimed they were
misclassified as independent contractors were reclassified as employees
following review. 202

198. See In re Hertz Corp., 2 N.Y.3d 733, 735 (2004) (ultimately holding that an individual was
an employee, despite a written agreement that he was an independent contractor, but considering
the written agreement when weighing the factors); see also In re Pepsi Cola Buffalo Bottling Corp.,
144 A.D.2d 220, 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that a driver was an employee, despite a
written agreement that he was independent contractor, because the hiring party had sufficient
supervision, control, and direction over him).
199. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-935(d) (2017).
200. See Markey, supra note 125; Reibstein et al., Nationwide Impact, supra note 136, at 30–31,
35–38.
201. In re Yoga Vida, 28 N.Y.3d at 1016.
202. NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE
COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES 2 n.5 (July 2015) (citing Lalith De
Silva et al., Independent Contractors: Prevalence and Implications for Unemployment Insurance
Programs, Planmatics, Inc., prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training
Administration (2000), http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf), http://nelp.org/content/uploa
ds/Independent-Contractor-Costs.pdf. Note that this study was issued in 2000, which some may
argue is “outdated” in the constantly-evolving gig economy. However, similar statistical data
pertaining to the gig economy is currently limited. See Bernhardt, supra note 5, at 42, 54.
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2. Enter into Written Contracts with any Existing, and
Future, Freelancers
Hiring parties should ensure that they provide written contracts for any
freelancers receiving $800 or more over a 120-day period since they, not the
freelancers, bear the burden of providing the written contract. 203 Although
OLPS’ website provides a sample contract for hiring parties to use,204 hiring
parties will likely need to supplement any written contracts to ensure that
they properly address any gaps that may expose them to liability. Employers
should consider preparing template language for contracts resembling the
language on page three of the sample contract provided by OLPS. 205
Template contracts should also include FIFA’s required terms, while
balancing the tension between FIFA and Yoga Vida. 206 Specifically, written
contracts should explain the results that the hiring party expects the freelancer
to produce rather than detailing the “manner” or the “means” to be used by
the freelancer. 207 This will mitigate concerns that the hiring party is directing
or controlling the services in question. 208
The written contracts must not contain any prohibited ancillary terms,
including class action waivers, arbitration agreements, or confidentiality
provisions that would prohibit the freelancer from contacting the OLPS
Director. 209 Additionally, hiring parties should revise any contracts with
outside staffing agencies to include indemnification provisions since FIFA
extends liability to hiring parties for adverse actions taken by the respective
“hiring party, their actual or apparent agent, or any other person acting
directly or indirectly on behalf of a hiring party . . . .” 210
3. Pay Freelancers as Required
Pursuant to FIFA, a hiring party must provide payment in full to the
freelancer on or before the date that payment is owed pursuant to the written
contract, or within 30 days from the completion of services if no date is
specified within the written contract. 211 Hiring parties should be aware that
FIFA does not currently have a good faith defense which would allow the
hiring party to escape liability if a freelancer produces sub-standard work or
if the hiring party mistakenly does not provide a written contract to a
freelancer who operated under a trade name.
203. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-928; see The Freelance Isn’t Free Act, FREELANCERS UNION,
https://www.freelancersunion.org/plain/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
204. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FREELANCE WORK AGREEMENT, https://www1.ny
c.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/workers/Model-Contract-Freelance.pdf.
205. See id.
206. Compare N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-929, with In re Yoga Vida, 28 N.Y.3d at 1015.
207. See In re Yoga Vida, 28 N.Y.3d at 1014.
208. Battaglia & Rosenblatt, supra note 97.
209. R.C.N.Y. § 12-05 (2017).
210. Id. § 12-04(b).
211. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-929.
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4. Be Proactive if a Complaint from OLPS Is Received on
Behalf of a Freelancer
If the hiring party does not respond to a complaint filed with OLPS, a
freelancer may file a claim against the hiring party in court, and a rebuttable
presumption that the hiring party committed the alleged violations arises; the
hiring party will have the burden to prove that it should not have to pay the
freelancer. 212 To avoid this rebuttable presumption, hiring parties should
immediately respond to any OLPS complaints. Further, hiring parties should
take OLPS complaints seriously because hiring parties may face a civil
penalty of up to $25,000 for repeated FIFA violations, along with all other
available penalties. 213 Because FIFA does not clarify how many violations
are required to constitute “repeated” violations, the Corporation Counsel
appears to have broad discretion and can potentially proceed against a hiring
party with as few as two violations. Thus, hiring parties must cautiously
ensure their compliance with FIFA’s provisions.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the gig economy, along with the increasing number of
freelancers in the American workforce, has led to unique questions about
employment structures in the United States, forcing policymakers to
reconsider the traditional notions of employment and benefits provided to the
American workforce. As the nation’s first legislation enshrining freelancers’
rights, FIFA undoubtedly marks a major turning point in that reconsideration
process, as FIFA seeks to develop protections for the growing independent
workforce. Under FIFA, freelancers are entitled to payment from hiring
parties, which ensures a degree of economic security for freelancers.
However, FIFA is currently brimming with ambiguities that threaten its
effectiveness.
FIFA cannot properly address the needs of both freelancers and hiring
parties unless these ambiguities are resolved. FIFA requires that hiring
parties pay freelancers, regardless of performance or quality, which conflicts
with the N.Y.S. Court of Appeals’ decision in Yoga Vida. Further, FIFA does
not adequately define the individuals covered by the Act or what occurs if a
hiring party, unaware that a freelancer operated under an entity or trade name,
fails to provide a written contract. Additionally, the scope of FIFA’s
prohibition on waivers, such as arbitration agreements, is unclear and could
be preempted by the FAA. Without additional clarification, both hiring
parties and freelancers will struggle to determine FIFA’s scope, resulting in
unnecessary confusion, increased settlement costs by hiring parties seeking
to avoid an uncertain outcome in the courts, or costly litigation wherein the

212. See id. § 20-931(d).
213. Id. § 20-934(b).

466

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 12

courts may ultimately be forced to interpret the ambiguities embedded within
FIFA contrary to the legislature’s intentions.
Hiring parties that retain freelancers from N.Y.C. or operate in N.Y.C.,
whether individuals or large corporations, should assume that FIFA applies
to them and take preventative measures to limit their liability. Hiring parties
should also review their relationships with their workers, starting by
confirming that their workers are properly classified as freelancers rather than
employees. Hiring parties should then enter into written contracts with any
existing, and future freelancers, and carefully ensure compliance with FIFA’s
requirements. To resolve FIFA’s ambiguity, N.Y.C. policymakers should
amend FIFA to clearly define who the Act covers and add a good faith
defense provision for hiring parties that addresses work quality and
performance disputes, consistent with Yoga Vida. These proposed
amendments are within the spirit of FIFA and further its laudable purposes
of preventing payment theft and protecting freelancers.
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